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Abstract
Opponents of school vouchers often argue that school vouchers will lead to
white flight from public schools that are disproportionately nonwhite, creating
more racially segregated schools. However, recent studies that examine white
flight from public schools into private schools have produced conflicting evidence
on whether or not white flight actually exists. In this paper, we present new evidence on whether universal vouchers will lead to more racially segregated schools.
Specifically, we use data on vote outcomes from a state-wide universal voucher
initiative to estimate the likelihood that white households with children currently
in public schools will use vouchers to switch out of more-integrated schools. Our
results indicate that white households with children attending schools with large
concentrations of nonwhite schoolchildren are significantly more likely to support
school vouchers, an effect that is absent for non-white households with children
and households without children. However, it also does not appear to be race, per
se, that is the primary concern, but other school factors that are correlated with
race, such as test scores and limited English proficiency.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: H3, I2, R2

I.

Introduction
In the debate over school choice, one of the chief concerns about universal vouchers is that they

may lead to more racially segregated schools. Since Brown v. Board of Education, school desegregation
efforts have attempted to ensure equal educational opportunities for students of all races through more
integrated schools. These efforts could be undermined if white households are more inclined to use
vouchers to flee from the public sector, creating more segregated schools.1 However, because no state has
yet adopted a comprehensive voucher, we cannot directly predict what the effects of such a policy are
likely to be. Instead, existing evidence on the impact of vouchers on racial segregation has come from
studies that examine “white flight” within the context of existing forms of school choice (e.g., private
schools, charter schools, or limited voucher programs). In general these studies have produced
conflicting evidence on whether or not expanded school choice will lead to more racially segregated
schools. For example, Lankford, Lee and Wyckoff (1995) and Fairlie and Resch (2002) find that higher
concentrations of black or minority students in area public schools increase the likelihood that white
households enroll their children in private schools, apparent evidence that vouchers will increase racial
segregation. However, other researchers, including Campbell, West and Peterson (2005) and Buddin,
Cordes, and Kirby (1998), find no evidence of ‘white flight’, suggesting that perhaps the concerns of
voucher opponents are overstated.
In this paper, we present new evidence on whether universal vouchers will lead to more racially
segregated schools. Specifically, we use data on vote outcomes from a state-wide universal voucher
initiative to estimate the likelihood that white households with children currently in public schools will
use vouchers to switch out of more-integrated schools. Our conceptual framework highlights the
difference between the causal effect of race on the residential and school choice decisions of white
households, and what we refer to as the equilibrium effect. The causal effect captures whether school
racial composition, per se, causes white households to opt out of public schools, all else equal. In order to
obtain causal estimates, the analyst must be concerned with potential bias from two types of omitted
variables: unobserved household preferences that may be correlated with the racial composition of the
school where the household currently resides, and unobserved school attributes that may be correlated
with racial composition (such as school quality). Once these biases are removed, the casual effect
measures the impact of racial composition if white households were randomly assigned to schools that are
identical except that they have different levels of minority concentration. In contrast, the equilibrium
1

Recent empirical evidence also suggests that the racial composition of a school is a large determinant of the blackwhite gap in test scores, with black students performing substantially better when they are in racially-mixed
environments, with no measurable effect for white students (Card and Rothstein, 2004; Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin,
2002). Thus, in addition to the basic civil rights concern that all students have access to an equal education, more
integrated schools appear to have a direct beneficial effect on black student performance.
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effect measures the impact of racial composition on household choices allowing for the fact that
households may have already sorted across neighborhood schools based on their preferences for racial
homogeneity and allowing for the fact that a school’s racial composition is likely correlated with other
school attributes. The equilibrium effect is thus an indication of the additional sorting, given the choices
that households have already made, that we should expect to occur under a comprehensive voucher
system.
While the causal effect is a legitimate concern in its own right, we argue that it is clearly the
equilibrium effect that is most important to policymakers concerned about the stratification effects of
adopting a universal voucher. To illustrate that point, consider the behavior that must occur in order for
vouchers to increase racial segregation beyond current levels: white households with children currently in
relatively integrated public schools must use the voucher to leave the public sector at higher rates than
non-white households with children in those schools. Note that from the perspective of whether vouchers
are likely to lead to more racially segregated schools, it does not matter why white households are opting
out, it only matters that they do. Whether whites are fleeing from minority students per se or from bad
schools, high crime, immigrants, etc., doesn’t really matter. If these are all highly correlated, the end
result will still be whites fleeing schools with observably more minority students, and universal vouchers
will still lead to increasingly segregated schools. On the other hand, it does matter that households have
already chosen their residential location and school, as parents that are relatively satisfied with their
current choice will be less likely to use the voucher to move. To use an extreme example, if there were
costless mobility and enough schools such that every household could send their child to a school with a
bundle of attributes that exactly matched their preferences (i.e., perfect Tiebout sorting), then the adoption
of vouchers would have no effect on the behavior of white households, regardless of the racial
composition of schools and even if the original sorting had been driven entirely by racial preferences.
Thus, whether vouchers will increase racial stratification depends on the relative impact of racial
composition (and all variables correlated with race) on household choices, allowing for Tiebout sorting.
Given the degree to which households have already sorted, the distinction between the casual and
equilibrium effects is not a trivial one. As pointed out by Clotfelter (2001), urban public schools
generally became more racially segregated in the 1990’s, while Urquiola (2005) finds that MSAs with
greater amounts of choice among districts are more stratified by income, race and educational attainment.
Policymakers concerned with the impact of adopting a comprehensive voucher program should therefore
focus on the equilibrium impact of the racial composition of schools on household behavior, recognizing
that households have chosen to reside in their current school district. However, we argue that few studies
of white flight have actually estimated this effect. Instead, we suggest that one explanation for the
conflicting empirical estimates of white flight found in the literature is that previous authors have defined
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white flight in different ways, estimating models that fall somewhere between the causal and equilibrium
effects.
In this paper, we focus specifically on identifying the likelihood that additional stratification may
occur under a comprehensive voucher system, given the choices that households have already made.
Unlike previous studies of white flight that have generally extrapolated from data under existing forms of
school choice (e.g., private schools or limited voucher programs), we use votes on a state-wide universal
voucher initiative in California as a proxy for voter intention to use the voucher. Assuming that support
for the initiative reflects a desire to take advantage of the voucher, voting patterns can reveal which
schools are most likely to lose students if a comprehensive voucher were adopted. One distinct advantage
of using this data is that, to the extent that voters are non-myopic, these patterns will take account of the
general equilibrium effects (e.g. changes in public school quality or the availability of private school
options) of a universal voucher.2 That is, a universal voucher, available to all families on a state-wide
basis, would fundamentally change the institutional structure of school finance and could impact
household decisions in ways that limited, targeted programs would not. Rather than extrapolating from
existing choices (that might have been very different under an entirely new system), our data may better
represent the school choice decisions that households would make under a universal voucher.
We find that a universal voucher is likely to increase racial segregation. White households with
children currently in public schools are increasingly supportive of the voucher if their children attend
schools that have higher concentrations of minority students, an effect that is absent for non-white
households. However, it does not appear to be race, per se, that is the primary concern, but other school
factors that are correlated with race, such as test scores and limited English proficiency. This suggests
that policymakers could mitigate the potential for segregation by working to improve school quality in
schools with large concentrations of minority students.
II.

Conceptual Framework
The primary motivation for this paper is the question of whether a universal voucher system will

lead to increased racial segregation. Much of the evidence on this question has come from studies of
‘white flight’ out of predominantly non-white public schools. However, the concept of ‘white flight’
involves several issues that are not always cleared delineated in the literature. In the most general sense,
white flight in education is simply the propensity for white households to opt out of public schools with
high concentrations of non-white students.3 However, this general definition begs several additional
2

See Epple, Romer, and Sieg (2001) and Calabrese, Epple, Romer, and Sieg (2005) for a discussion of whether
voters are myopic.
3
Wikipedia actually defines white flight as “a colloquial term for the demographic trend of upper and middle class
white people moving away from (predominantly non-white) inner cities, finding new homes in nearby suburbs or
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questions. For instance, when white households opt out, where do they go? Original studies of white
flight were concerned with white flight out of urban areas to suburban neighborhoods (i.e., residential
choice).4 More recent studies have focused on white flight into private schools (i.e., school choice).5
These studies often use methods that control for the fact that white households may have already sorted
residentially, attempting to purge any effect this sorting may have on the public-private school choice.
However, from the perspective of whether vouchers are likely to lead to more racially segregated schools,
white flight due to either residential or school sorting is important. Predicting the equilibrium impact of a
voucher system on racial segregation must include both the direct impact of a school’s racial and ethnic
composition on the desire to opt out, plus the effects of preference differences between parents residing in
predominantly minority and non-minority school districts.
Furthermore, note that increases in racial segregation will only occur if white households opt out
at significantly greater rates than non-white households. If white and minority families are equally likely
to use vouchers to opt out of the public sector when their children attend schools with high concentrations
of minority students, then these schools may lose a large number of students but there may be little effect
on the overall racial composition of public schools.6 Thus, to predict the equilibrium impact of vouchers
on residential segregation, one must examine how a school’s racial composition affects the school choice
decisions of both white and nonwhite households.
To develop the empirical implications of the points made above, we present a very simple model
of voucher use that conditions only on the demographic composition of the school. Let Yis denote the
likelihood that an individual i who is a member of group k ( k = white, nonwhite) in school s uses the
voucher. This is assumed to be linear function of the minority share in the school, M s , the individual’s
unobserved preferences for racial homogeneity, Pis , and an idiosyncratic error term, ε is :

Yis = β 0k + β1k M s + Pis + ε is

(1)

Pis may be correlated with M s to the extent that households have already sorted based on race; that is,
households may have already chosen their current school based in part on their preferences for racial

even moving to new locales entirely, e.g. from the Rust Belt to the Sun Belt.” The entry then goes on to discuss the
effect of desegregation on white flight from urban public schools.
4
See, for example, Clotfelter (2001), Crowder (2000), and Galster (1990).
5
These include Lankford, Lee and Wyckoff (1995), Conlon and Kimenyi (1991), Buddin, Cordes and Kirby (1998),
Lankford and Wyckoff (2000), Fairlie and Resch (2002), and Betts and Fairlie (2003).
6
Many studies of white flight have used results solely from white households to draw implications about racial
stratification under vouchers, but doing so implicitly assumes that only white households will flee while non-white
households will stay. While this may be a relatively safe assumption, it is, of course, an empirical question.
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homogeneity. β 1k is the direct effect of minority concentration on voucher use by group k , controlling
for these preferences.
The equilibrium effect of a change in minority concentration on voucher use by group k is thus
defined as:

 dYis
 dM s

β 1k , Eq = Mean k 

 dE[ Pis | k , s ] 


 = β1k + 
dM
s




(2)

Let us assume that as a result of sorting, the preferences of an individual in school s can be described with
a linear function of school minority share and an idiosyncratic error, µ is :

Pis = α 0k + α 1k M s + µ is

(3)

The average group preferences in a neighborhood are described by:

E[ Pis | k , s ] = α 0k + α 1k M s + E[ µ is | k , s ] = α 0k + α 1k M s ,
which implies that

(4)

dE[ Pis | k , s ]
= α 1k . Using equations (2) through (4), the equilibrium effect of a
dM s

change in minority concentration on voucher use can now be expressed as:

β1k , Eq = β1k + α 1k ,

(5)

Note that if white households with strong preferences for racial homogeneity have already sorted into
more homogeneous schools, we would expect α 1w (where w denotes white households) to be less than
zero. Thus, equation (5) makes it clear that for white households, residential sorting will mitigate the
equilibrium impact of racial composition on voucher use, relative to the direct effect alone.
For estimation, we cannot observe preferences so the expected value of the ordinary least squares
estimator of β 1k can be derived from equation (1) using standard theoretical results on omitted variables
with one observable regressor, M s ; and simplified using equation (3). Specifically,

[

]

 E[ Pis , M s | k ] 
 = β 1k + α 1k
E β 1k , OLS M s , k = β1k + 
2

 E[( M s ) | k ] 

(6)

which equals the equilibrium effect derived in equation (5). Thus, with data on voucher use and school
minority share, we can uncover the equilibrium effect of school racial composition on voucher use by
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estimating a very simple model with OLS. A comparison of these effects for white and non-white
households can then indicate the extent of any changes in racial segregation that may follow the adoption
of a universal voucher program.
Unobserved school attributes
Defining white flight as the general propensity for white households to opt out of public schools
with high concentrations of non-white students also raises the question of whether it is race, per se, that is
driving white households away. Equation (1) is highly simplified in that school minority share is the only
school characteristic that affects voucher use. However, it has been well-established that race is
correlated with a number of school characteristics that may also factor into the decisions of white
households, most notably school quality.7 Many studies have therefore attempted to distinguish between
race and other correlated factors as the motivation for white flight. Not surprisingly, controlling for other
school attributes typically leads to smaller effects of race. Yet, from the perspective of whether vouchers
are likely to lead to more racially segregated schools, it does not necessarily matter why white households
are opting out; it only matters that they are. We therefore specifically do not want to include any
variables that are correlated with school minority share that may affect a household’s decision to use the
voucher. This is not to say that the underlying reasons are not important, as they certainly hold significant
social and policy implications. But in this particular case, it truly is correlation, not causation, that
matters. If we want to answer the question of whether vouchers are likely to increase racial segregation, it
is sufficient to estimate equation (1), separately for white and non-white households, to obtain the
coefficient in equation (6), what we refer to as the equilibrium effect of racial composition.
In contrast, to estimate the true causal effect of racial composition, itself, on the likelihood that
white households will want to use a voucher, we should control for both residential sorting and school
attributes that may be correlated with race. The equilibrium effect includes both these biases but note that
they work in opposite directions. The bias from sorting will generally lead to an equilibrium effect that is
smaller than the causal effect (since households that have already sorted are less likely to use the
voucher), whereas the bias from the omitted school characteristics will generally lead to an equilibrium
effect that is larger than the causal effect (since it may not be race, per se, that causes households to opt
out). With this framework, we can now begin to understand the seemingly “conflicting” results of
previous studies of white flight. Many of these studies estimate models that fall somewhere in between
the equilibrium effect and the causal effect and they find correspondingly larger or smaller effects of race.
7

For example, Downes and Zabel (2002) and Brasington and Haurin (2005) find that households appear to use easily
observable characteristics, such as race, when comparing public school quality among schools. Their results suggest
that perceived school quality is higher in schools and school districts that contain lower concentrations of minority
students.
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In general, studies that account for sorting will tend to find larger effects than studies that do not. On the
other hand, studies that include better controls for school characteristics that may be correlated with race
will tend to find smaller effects of race, relative to studies with fewer or weaker controls.
It is therefore not surprising to find that studies that are generally considered to provide support
for the white flight hypothesis tend to estimate models that control well for sorting but have weak controls
for omitted variables. For example, Lankford, Lee and Wyckoff (1995), Conlon and Kimenyi (1991),
Fairlie and Resch (2002) and Betts and Fairlie (2003) all measure racial concentration at the MSA and/or
county level to examine white flight from public to private schools. Since the decision of which MSA to
live in is likely driven by factors other than preferences for school attributes (for example availability of
jobs or presence of family members), analysis at the MSA level provides relatively exogenous variation in
minority concentration and thus controls relatively well for within-MSA sorting on school attributes.
Thus, these studies that control for residential sorting within MSAs, are likely to produce estimates of
white flight that are larger than the equilibrium effect. At the same time, in each of these studies, the only
controls for school quality are the average level of spending per pupil and/or the average student to
teacher ratio in the MSA or county. Given the lack of evidence that these measures are good proxies for
quality, particularly at higher levels of aggregation, this is unlikely to do much to reduce any bias from
omitted variables and may also lead to larger estimates. 8
Conversely, studies that are generally cited as evidence against the existence of white flight tend
to estimate models that do not consider residential sorting but have stronger controls for school quality.
For example, Campbell, West and Peterson (2005) use the racial composition in the public school in
which an individual student resides, a measure which is likely to suffer from much stronger sorting bias
and lead to smaller estimates for the effect of race. They also include per-pupil spending for the district in
which the student resides, arguably still a weak measure of school quality but stronger than spending at
the county or MSA level and so would lead to somewhat smaller estimates. Buddin, Cordes and Kirby
(1998) use test scores, a much stronger measure of school quality, and also find no statistically significant
effects of race.
To our knowledge, only one paper, Lankford and Wyckoff (2000), attempts to deal directly with
both residential sorting and omitted school characteristics, thus producing estimates that are closest to the
true casual effect. They find a negative and statistically significant effect of school racial composition on
the decision of white households to send their children to private school but find much larger effects on
the decision of white households to move to the suburbs.

8

See Hanushek (1986) for a review of the literature on the relationship between school spending and student
performance.
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Will vouchers increase racial segregation?
Note that none of these studies estimate effects that are truly equivalent to the equilibrium effect.
Since predicting whether or not a universal voucher system will lead to increased racial segregation
depends on this equilibrium effect, we believe this is still very much an open question. If we had data on
actual voucher take-up in a universal voucher system, we could estimate equation (1) directly and β1
would capture the equilibrium effect. Unfortunately, such data do not exist; although several states have
considered legislation to establish universal vouchers, none have yet adopted such a policy.9 In order to
predict the effects of wide-scale vouchers, many of the studies mentioned earlier have extrapolated from
the existing choice to attend private school. Campbell, West and Peterson (2005) use data on actual
voucher use in a national voucher program. However, that program was targeted to low-income families
and may not reflect behavior under a universal voucher system. A universal voucher, available to all
families on a state-wide basis, would fundamentally change the institutional structure of school finance
and could impact household decisions in ways that limited, targeted programs would not. For example, a
universal voucher may lead to improvements in public school quality or in the availability of private
school options, changes that may not arise under targeted programs. Thus, even if previous papers had
been trying to estimate the equilibrium, rather than the causal, effect, it is unclear whether those
predictions would hold in the very different institutional setting created by a comprehensive voucher.
In this paper, we estimate the equilibrium effect using data on vote outcomes from a state-wide
universal voucher initiative in California. Specifically, we estimate equation (1) using votes for
California’s Proposition 38 as a proxy for voucher take-up. Proposition 38 was a statewide ballot
initiative in 2000 that would have provided families with a scholarship for every child enrolled in a
private school. The scholarship would have been the greatest of three amounts: $4,000, half the national
average of public school spending per pupil, or half California’s public school spending per pupil. The
initiative placed few conditions on scholarship-redeeming schools and prohibited the state from placing
additional conditions on these schools in the future. Because the scholarship would have been made
available to all students, including those already enrolled in private schools, Proposition 38 would have
created the first universal voucher system in the United States.
It seems reasonable to assume that someone who wishes to use the voucher would vote for
Proposition 38. If we assume that voters are cognizant of the general equilibrium effects that may follow
the adoption of a comprehensive voucher, then we can use those votes to predict which schools are most
likely to lose students under the new policy. At the same time, we recognize that voting on Proposition
9

It should be noted that other countries have adopted fairly comprehensive voucher programs. Hsieh and Urquiola
(2004) find that that Chile’s voucher program led to increased sorting as a disproportionate number of students from
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38 may also have been influenced by factors other than a direct desire to use the voucher. For example,
people may have voted for or against the initiative because they expected it to affect their property values
or the quality of their child’s school. An individual’s political persuasion (i.e., Republican or Democrat,
conservative or liberal) also may have impacted their vote. Because we want to capture voucher take-up,
we will need to expand equation (1) to control for any variables that might affect voting for reasons other
than a direct desire to use the voucher.
III.

Analysis Using Survey Data
During August, September and October of 2000, the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC)

surveyed a total of 6,022 potential voters concerning issues related to the November 2000 ballot. The
surveys were conducted by telephone, using a random-dialing procedure, and were restricted to people
age eighteen or older. Baldassare (2000a, 2000b, 2000c) compares the distributions of various
characteristics among survey respondents with the distributions of those characteristics from the 2000
Census. He finds that the survey distributions are quite similar to the Census distributions, indicating that
the surveys were successful in obtaining a representative sample of California residents.
Our focus is on the voting behavior of households with children in public school. Specifically,
we seek to ascertain whether white households with children in public school were more likely to support
the voucher if their child attended a school with a large concentration of minority students.10 Of the 6,022
respondents, 1,636 had children enrolled in public school. Because the PPIC survey does not identify the
public school attended by each respondent’s children, we used data from the 2000 Census geographic
files to match the zip code of each respondent to the corresponding closest public high school.
Specifically, we first matched the zip code of each respondent to a corresponding school district. We then
matched the centroid of the zip code to the closest public high school within that school district. In cases
where a zip code crossed district boundaries, we matched the zip code to the closest public high school in
each of the districts that were associated with the zip code. We then weighted the characteristics of each
school (fraction minority, student enrollment, etc) by the fraction of the zip code’s population residing in
that school district. Using this procedure we were able to assign detailed public school characteristics to
each respondent in our sample. All school-level data for the 1999-2000 academic year were obtained
from the California Department of Education.

high- and middle-income households opted out of the public sector. Ladd and Fiske (2001) find that the
introduction of a quasi-universal voucher system in New Zealand led to increased racial segregation.
10
Note that households with children already in private school may be influenced by the minority concentration in
the local public school as well, and may vote for the voucher to create a subsidy for themselves. However, because
those students have already opted out of the public sector, it is only households with children in public schools that
will have a marginal effect on the racial composition of public schools in the aftermath of a voucher.
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Our baseline specification contains only minority concentration in a respondent’s local public
high school, and a small set of variables that are likely to affect voting on the voucher for reasons other
than a direct desire to use the voucher. School minority concentration is measured as the fraction of
students in a local public high school that are nonwhite. We also include indicator variables for gender,
political ideology, homeownership status, and whether a school is located in a rural area. The gender
indicator, which has a value of unity for female voters, controls for systematic gender differences in voter
support for school vouchers. The ideology indicator takes a value of unity if the respondent reported
being politically somewhat conservative or very conservative, and is included to account for the fact that
school vouchers are a mainstay of conservative political ideology. The homeownership variable captures
the fact that vouchers may affect property values. In a system where households must live in a particular
neighborhood in order to attend a particular school, it is well-established that school quality will be
capitalized into housing values (e.g., Black, 1999) as families must pay a premium to live in high-quality
districts. Vouchers remove this residential constraint and as discussed in Nechyba (2000, 2003), vouchers
may therefore cause property values to rise in low-quality districts and to fall in high-quality districts.
This creates incentives for homeowners to vote for or against vouchers, depending on where they
currently reside. This prediction is supported by Brunner, Sonstelie and Thayer (2001) and Brunner and
Sonstelie (2003) who find that homeowners are significantly less likely to support school vouchers if they
live in a good school district. To account for the fact that capitalization effects are likely to be weak or
nonexistent in rural areas where the supply of housing is relatively elastic we also include an indicator
variable that takes the value of unity if a school is located in a rural area.11
Finally, we also include a set of Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) fixed effects in our analysis
to control for unobservable regional variation in support for school vouchers. We use the December 2000
definitions of metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas, developed by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), to define MSAs. Metropolitan areas are defined as urbanized areas with a population of
at least 50,000, while micropolitan areas are defined as urbanized areas with a population of at least
10,000 but less than 50,000. Both metropolitan and micropolitan areas are defined in terms of counties
and include both the county containing the central core of the urbanized area and adjacent counties that
have a high degree of economic integration as measured through commuting patterns. Of the 58 counties
in California, 46 are located in one of the 37 metropolitan or micropolitan areas within the state. For

11

See Reback (2005) and Hilber and Mayer (2004) for a discussion of, and evidence on, capitalization effects in
rural areas.
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respondents located in one of the 12 counties that are not part of a metropolitan or micropolitan area we
define MSAs in terms of the county within which the respondent lives.12
Our data have a number of limitations. The first limitation concerns missing data. Among the
1,636 respondents with children in public school, 182 did not answer the question about how they
intended to vote on the voucher initiative, 29 refused to report their race, and an additional 58 respondents
reported a zip code that either did not exist or was located in a state other than California. We eliminated
these respondents, leaving 1,367 respondents. Several respondents also did not answer two of the
questions used in the analysis. Specifically, 27 respondents did not answer the question about political
ideology and 26 did not report their homeownership status. Rather than exclude these respondents from
our analysis, we created two dummy variables indicating whether observations on ideology or
homeownership were missing. We then included the ideology and homeownership variables (with
missing values recoded to zero) and the two missing value dummy variables in our analysis.
The second limitation concerns zip codes that overlap school district boundaries. Recall that for
zip codes that cross district boundaries, we use a weighted average of the fraction of nonwhite students.
Specifically, for each district within a zip code, we weighted the fraction of minority students in the
closest high school within the district by the fraction of the zip code’s population residing in the district.
Because we cannot precisely match each respondent in our sample to a unique public high school, our
measure of minority concentration most likely suffers from measurement error. This, in turn, would tend
to bias the parameter estimate on minority concentration towards zero. To mitigate that bias, we restrict
our analysis to include only those respondents that live in a zip code where at least 75% of the zip code’s
population resides within the boundaries of a single school district. That restriction reduces our sample
by about 10%, leaving us with 1,225 observations for our analysis.
The final limitation of the survey data is related to the stated versus revealed preference nature of
the survey. While the PPIC survey was successful in obtaining a representative sample of Californians,
there is one dimension in which the survey is not representative. Forty-six percent of respondents stated
that they intended to vote for the voucher initiative. In contrast, only 30 percent of the actual ballots cast
in the November election were in favor of the initiative. We conduct our analysis under the working
assumption that the survey responses are valid for testing whether certain factors affect the likelihood of
supporting the voucher even though the responses in the aggregate predict more support for the voucher
than was actually witnessed at the polls. We will test the validity of this assumption in section IV.

12

We also estimated all the models and specifications reported in the paper using county fixed effects rather than
MSA fixed effects. All of the results obtained using county fixed effects were quite similar to those reported in the
paper. Results are available upon request.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics
Variable
Vote on Voucher Initiative
(1=yes, 0=no)
Homeownership
Female
Conservative
Minority Share
Rural

White Households
0.46
(0.50)

Nonwhite Households
0.58
(0.49)

0.70
(0.46)
0.53
(0.50)
0.38
(0.48)
0.46
(0.24)
0.10
(0.31)

0.43
(0.49)
0.54
(0.50)
0.40
(0.49)
0.71
(0.25)
0.05
(0.22)

672
380

553
314

Observations
Schools

Summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis are reported in Table 1. As mentioned
earlier, vouchers will only lead to changes in racial stratification patterns if white and non-white
households use the voucher at very different rates. Therefore, although our primary focus is on the voting
behavior of white households with children, we will also examine how minority concentration affects the
voting behavior of nonwhite households with children. Table 1 thus reports the mean and standard
deviation (in parentheses) of each variable separately for white households with children in public school
and for minority households with children in public school. A brief inspection of Table 1 reveals several
interesting patterns. First, white households with children in public school were less likely to support the
voucher, on average, than nonwhite households with children in public school. This complements the
findings Campbell, West and Peterson (2005) who examine the determinants of voucher application and
voucher usage among a sample of households that were eligible for the Children’s Scholarship Fund
(CSF), a program that offers private school vouchers to low-income families. Their results suggest that,
relative to whites, African-Americans and Hispanics were significantly more likely to apply for CSF
vouchers. Second, as expected, white households tended to have substantially higher homeownership
rates than minority households. Third, children from white households tended to attend schools with
substantially lower concentrations of minority students than children from minority households. That
finding is consistent with the notion that there is already significant racial stratification across California’s
public schools.
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Table 2
Estimated Coefficients for White Households with Children in Public School
Regression Specification:
Minority
Homeowner
Conservative
Female
Rural

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.246**
(0.108)
-0.034
(0.044)
0.278**
(0.040)
-0.056
(0.040)
0.143**
(0.067)

0.308**
(0.117)
-0.035
(0.044)
0.281**
(0.040)
-0.053
(0.040)
0.139**
(0.067)
-0.102
(0.074)

0.282**
(0.120)
-0.006
(0.049)
0.277**
(0.040)
-0.061
(0.040)
0.130*
(0.068)
-0.091
(0.074)
-0.006
(0.033)
-0.047
(0.041)
-0.004*
(0.002)

Population Density
log Income
Education
Age

Observations
672
672
672
R-squared
0.16
0.16
0.17
Notes: (1) Robust, clustered standard errors in brackets, (2) all specifications include
MSA fixed effects, (3) * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%

Results
We examine the relationship between minority concentration and support for school vouchers
using a linear probability model.13 Parameter estimates for the sample of white households with children
in public school are presented in Table 2 with standard errors in parentheses. Since the school-level
characteristics in our analysis do not vary across respondents located in the same school attendance zone,
we adjust the standard errors to account for clustering of the data at the school level. Results for our
baseline specification that includes a limited set of control variables are reported in column 1 of Table 2.
The coefficient on minority concentration reveals whether white households with children in public
school were more likely to support the voucher if their child attended a school with a large concentration
of minority students. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the five percent level. The
point estimate also suggests that minority concentration has a relatively large effect on the propensity of

13

white households with children to support school vouchers. For example, our model predicts that
increasing the share of minority students in a school from 10% to 80% would increase support for the
voucher among white households with children in public school by 17 percentage points.
Column 2 of Table 2 presents results from an expanded specification that adds population density
(measured at the zip code level) to the baseline model. We include this variable to further control for the
fact that concerns over the potential impact of school vouchers on housing values may induce voters
located in more densely populated areas to vote for or against the voucher for reasons other than a direct
desire to use the voucher. Specifically, as demonstrated by Hilber and Mayer (2004), the degree to which
school quality is capitalized into housing values will depend on the supply of land available for new
development. Capitalization effects are likely to be stronger in more densely populated areas that contain
a limited supply of land for new development.14 At the same time, however, population density may
directly affect whether a household is likely to use the voucher. In particular, population density is highly
correlated with whether a school is located in an urban or suburban area. To the extent that households
who have chosen to move to the suburbs have done so to escape high concentrations of minorities,
controlling for population density will also control to some extent for preference for racial homogeneity.
Thus, population density may also affect voucher take-up directly. For this reason, we do not include
population density in the baseline specification but add it as a specification check. Adding population
density to the model causes the coefficient on minority concentration to increase somewhat in magnitude
from 0.246 to 0.308. The fact that the coefficient on minority concentration increases in magnitude when
we control for population density is consistent with the notion that population density may be capturing
differences across urban and suburban areas in preferences for racial homogeneity. In particular, as we
noted in section II, controlling for unobserved preferences for racial homogeneity should produce
estimates of white flight that are larger than the equilibrium effect.
We also estimate an additional model that adds a standard set of demographic variables found in
the literature on public-private school choice (e.g. Figlio and Stone 2001; Lankford and Wyckoff 2000;
Fairlie and Resch 2002). These include family income, parental education, and the age of the parent who
responded to the survey.15 In the PPIC survey, respondents were asked to report their family income and
age in terms of six mutually exclusive ranges (e.g. income of $40,000 to $59,999 or age between 45 and
54). We used the midpoints of these ranges to assign a unique income and age value to each respondent.
These variables may affect voting behavior through ideological preferences but are also quite likely to
13

We estimate a linear probability model for ease of interpretation and for comparison with results reported later in
the paper. We have also estimated all the specifications using a binary logit model. The results were qualitatively
and quantitatively similar to those reported in the text. Results are available upon request.
14
Hilber and Mayer (2004) provide evidence consistent with this hypothesis.
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directly affect desire to use the voucher and we therefore include them as a specification check only.
Results based on a specification that adds these variables to the model are reported in column 3 of Table
2. The inclusion of these additional explanatory variables has little effect on our parameter estimates,
particularly the minority concentration variable.16
Recall that to mitigate measurement error we restricted our analysis to include only those
respondents that lived in a zip codes where at least 75% of the zip code’s population resided within the
boundaries of a single school district. Table 2A of the appendix investigates how sensitive our baseline
results are to this restriction. Column 1 presents results for a specification that uses the entire sample of
743 respondents that are White with children in public school. Column 2 presents results for a
specification that limits the sample to include only those respondents that lived in a zip code where at
least 65% of the population resided within the boundaries of a single school district. Similarly, columns
3, 4, and 5 present results for specifications where we limit the sample to include only those respondents
that lived in a zip code where at least 75% (column 3) or 85% (column 4) or 95% (column 5) of the
population resided within the boundaries of a single school district. Consistent with the notion that
measurement error may bias the coefficient on minority concentration towards zero, the point estimates
for the minority concentration variable reported in columns 2 through 5 are all larger than the estimate
reported in column 1, and continually increase in magnitude. Furthermore, note that while the point
estimates on the minority share variable reported in Table 2A vary in magnitude, they are all positive and,
with the exception of the coefficient in column 1, they are all statistically significant at the 10 percent
level or better.
Nonwhite Households with Children
The results reported in Tables 2 and 2A consistently suggest that white households with children
in public school are more likely to support school vouchers if their child attends a school with a large
concentration of minority students. Higher support for a universal voucher suggests that these households
are more likely to use the voucher to opt out of the public school sector. Our results are therefore
consistent with the notion that universal vouchers would lead to increased “white flight” from public
schools into private schools. However, this alone does not necessarily imply that vouchers would lead to
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Forty-five of the respondents in our sample did not answer the question regarding income. We included missing
observation flags for these individuals.
16
We also estimated a model that added only income, education and age to the baseline model. Results based on
that specification were nearly identical to those reported in column 1 of Table 2. In particular, adding these
variables to the model caused the coefficient on minority concentration to decline modestly from 0.246 to 0.224.
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Table 3
Estimated Coefficients for Minority Households with Children in Public School
and Households without Children
Regression Specification:
Minority
Homeowner
Conservative
Female
Rural

White with
Children

Nonwhite
with Children

White
no Children

Nonwhite
no Children

0.246**
(0.108)
-0.034
(0.044)
0.278**
(0.040)
-0.056
(0.040)
0.143**
(0.067)

-0.109
(0.107)
-0.031
(0.044)
0.169**
(0.041)
-0.036
(0.045)
-0.085
(0.115)

0.003
(0.056)
-0.064**
(0.023)
0.292**
(0.024)
-0.027
(0.022)
0.048
(0.049)

0.135
(0.088)
-0.098**
(0.040)
0.129**
(0.039)
-0.003
(0.036)
-0.111
(0.121)

Observations
672
553
2032
760
R-squared
0.16
0.09
0.11
0.08
Notes: (1) Robust, clustered standard errors in brackets, (2) all specifications include MSA fixed
effects, (3) * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%

more racially segregated public schools. For example, if minority families are equally likely to opt out of
the public sector when their children attend schools with high concentrations of minority students, then
vouchers may have little effect on the overall racial composition of public schools. Thus, to determine
whether universal vouchers will lead to more racially segregated public schools, we must also examine
how minority concentration affects the voting behavior of minority households with children in public
school. We therefore estimated the same baseline specification (reported in column 1 of Table 2) using
the sample of minority households. The results are reported in column 2 of Table 3. For comparison
purposes, the results from our baseline specification for white households with children in public school
are reported in column 1 of Table 3. For the sample of minority households with children in public
school the coefficient on the minority share variable is statistically insignificant, negative, and quite small
in magnitude, suggesting that the voting behavior of minority households is unresponsive to the share of
minority students their children are exposed to. Thus, taken together, the results reported in columns 1
and 2 suggest that universal vouchers would lead to more racially segregated public schools.
Households without School-Age Children
We have argued that the results reported in Table 2 suggest that white households with children in
public school are more likely to use the voucher if their children attend schools with high concentrations
of minority students. We have included several variables to control for factors that may affect a
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households’ vote on the voucher initiative other than a direct desire to use the voucher. However, it is
still possible that white households residing in areas with high-concentrations of minority students may be
voting for the voucher initiative not because they intend to use the vouchers but because of other
unobservable factors that affect their support for vouchers. To examine that possibility, we estimated our
baseline specification using the sample of white households with no school-age children. Assuming that
the results reported in Table 2 are being driven primarily by a desire among white households with
children in more integrated schools to use school vouchers, the voting behavior of white household with
and without school-age children should look quite different. In particular, we should observe white
households with school-age children having a much stronger reaction to minority concentration than
white households without school-age children. In contrast, if the results reported in Table 2 are being
driven by indirect benefits associated with the voucher, the voting behavior of white household with and
without school-age children should look similar.
Results for the sample of white households with no school-age children are reported in column 3
of Table 3. For the sample of white households with no school-age children, the coefficient on the
minority share variable is statistically insignificant and quite small in magnitude, suggesting that the
voting behavior of white households with no school-age children is unresponsive to the share of minority
students that attend their local public schools. That finding gives us increased confidence that the results
reported in Table 2 are capturing a relationship between support for school vouchers and minority
concentration that is unique to white households with children in public school. As a further specification
check, we also re-estimated our baseline specification using the sample of nonwhite households with no
school-age children. Those results are reported in column 4 of Table 3. Once again, the coefficient on
the minority concentration variable is small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. Thus, similar to
white households with no school-age children, our results suggest that nonwhite households with no
school-age children are also unresponsive to the share of minority students that attend their local public
schools.

District Level Results
The results reported in Tables 2 and 3 are based on a school-level measure of minority
concentration. Our decision to focus on schools rather than districts was motivated by the fact that
parents can exercise Tiebout choice not only by choosing a particular school district but by choosing a
school within a district.17 Thus, to capture the equilibrium effect of minority concentration, we wanted to
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Epple and Romano (2003) provide evidence from Los Angeles county that suggest school-level sorting may be
just as important, if not more important, than district-level sorting. Similarly, Urquiola (2005) and Rothstein (2004)
both find evidence of significant racial stratification across neighborhood schools.
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allow for as much sorting as possible. Nevertheless, given the nature of our survey data, there is a
potential drawback to focusing on schools rather than districts. Because we do not know the actual school
a respondent’s child attends, we are forced to assume that a respondent’s child attends the school that is
closest to the centroid of the zip code in which the respondent lives. As a result, to the extent that this is
not an accurate match, our measure of school minority concentration is prone to measurement error.
Thus, there is an inherent tradeoff when choosing between measuring minority concentration at the school
or district level. On the one hand, school-level measures of minority concentration most likely provide a
better indication of the amount of racial stratification that already exists in the public sector. On the other
hand, district-level measures of minority concentration are less prone to measurement error resulting from
incorrectly assigning respondents to neighborhood schools.
In light of this tradeoff, we also estimated several specifications of our baseline model that
measure minority concentration at the district level rather than the school-level.18 Results based on the
sample that includes respondents that live in a zip code where at least 75% of the zip code’s population
resides within the boundaries of a single school district are reported in Table 4. Column 1 of Table 4
presents results for the sample of white households with children in public school. Columns 2 through 4
present results for the sample of nonwhite households with children in public school, white households
with no school-age children and nonwhite households with no school-age children respectively. In
general the district-level results reported in Table 4 mirror the school-level results reported in Table 3.
For white households with children in public school the coefficient on district-level minority
concentration is positive, statistically significant, and slightly larger in magnitude than the coefficient
obtained using the school-level measure of minority concentration. Furthermore, similar to the schoollevel results, minority concentration appears to have little to no effect on the voting behavior of any group
other than white households with children in public school. Thus, the district-level results support our
earlier conclusion that universal vouchers are likely to lead to increased white flight from public
schools.19
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In cases where a zip code crossed district boundaries, we used a weighted average of the fraction of nonwhite
students in each district. Specifically, for each district within a zip code, we weighted the fraction of nonwhite
students in that district by the fraction of the zip code’s population residing in that district.
19
For the sample of white households with children in public school, we also estimated the same specifications
reported in Table 2A of the appendix using district-level minority concentration rather than school-level minority
concentration. Specifically, we estimated specifications of the baseline model that included the entire sample of 743
white households with children in public school, and specifications that limited the sample to include only those
respondents that lived in a zip code where at least 65%, 75%, 85%, or 95% of the population resided within the
boundaries of a single district. The results obtained were qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported in
Table 2A except for the fact that the coefficient on minority concentration was slightly larger in magnitude and
statistically significant at the 5% level or better in all specifications. Results are available upon request.
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Table 4
Estimated Coefficients using District-Level Minority Concentration
Regression Specification:
District Minority
Homeowner
Conservative
Female
Rural

(1)
White with
Children

(2)
Nonwhite
with Children

(3)
White
no Children

(4)
Nonwhite
no Children

0.262**
(0.101)
-0.035
(0.044)
0.278**
(0.039)
-0.05
(0.045)
0.122
(0.138)

-0.053
(0.122)
-0.017
(0.039)
0.161**
(0.039)
-0.015
(0.052)
0.558**
(0.165)

-0.059
(0.049)
-0.067**
(0.021)
0.291**
(0.022)
-0.027
(0.026)
-0.051
(0.077)

0.180*
(0.103)
-0.100**
(0.043)
0.132**
(0.036)
-0.004
(0.042)
0.123
(0.253)

Observations
672
554
2033
761
R-squared
0.16
0.1
0.11
0.08
Notes: (1) Robust, clustered standard errors in brackets, (2) all specifications include MSA fixed
effects, (3) * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%

Sorting bias
The results presented thus far capture the equilibrium effect of school minority concentration
which, as discussed in Section II, includes both a direct effect of school racial composition on support for
the voucher and the bias due to sorting. We have argued that this is the appropriate measure if one wishes
to predict the impact of universal vouchers on racial segregation. However, for comparison with previous
studies of white flight, and to add insight about household preferences, it is also informative to assess the
sign and magnitude of the sorting bias. In order to do this, we can use an instrumental variables approach
to isolate the direct effect. An effective instrument will be one that is correlated with minority
concentration in the school but unrelated to a voter’s preferences for choosing that particular school or to
their preferences for vouchers. If we assume that a household’s decision to move to a particular area of
the state is exogenously determined, then following Dustmann and Preston (2001), we can use the
minority concentration in the larger geographic area as an instrument for school minority concentration.
For example, it is common to assume that people are drawn to a particular city or metropolitan area
because of a job or family, and then choose where to live within that area based on preferences for
schools and neighborhood characteristics. As discussed by Dustmann and Preston, the IV estimates may
still be biased if the decision to live in the larger area is not completely exogenous (though the bias is
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Table 5
Instrumental Variables Estimation
Variable

O.L.S

I.V.

Minority

0.246**
(0.108)
-0.034
(0.044)
0.278**
(0.040)
-0.056
(0.040)
0.143**
(0.067)

0.485*
(0.252)
-0.021
(0.044)
0.280**
(0.039)
-0.06
(0.037)
0.177**
(0.079)

672

672

Homeowner
Conservative
Female
Rural

Observations
Hansen J Statistic p-value = 0.16

C Statistic for exogeneity of 20 mile radius instrument p-value = 0.24
Notes: (1) Robust, clustered standard errors in brackets, (2) all specifications
include MSA fixed effects, (3) * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%

generally smaller than the bias in the OLS estimates). We would thus want to use a geographic area that
is sufficiently large. However, even if the instrument were strictly exogenous, the IV estimates will only
reduce the sorting bias to the extent that the school minority concentration is correlated with the area
minority concentration. Thus, we would want to use an area around the school that is sufficiently small.
Keeping this trade-off in mind, we use three instruments that reflect areas of varying sizes to assess the
size and direction of the sorting bias. Specifically, we use as instruments the average percent minority in
all other schools within a 20, 25, and 30 mile radius around the household’s chosen school.
Table 5 shows the results of the IV estimation. For comparison purposes the first column repeats
the OLS results from our baseline specification in Table 2 while the second column reports the
instrumental variables results. Note that the point estimate on minority concentration in the I.V. results is
substantially larger in magnitude than the OLS estimate. This is consistent with the discussion in Section
II which suggested that if white households with strong preferences for racial homogeneity have already
sorted into more homogeneous schools, the OLS. estimate will be biased downwards relative to the true
causal effect.
Note that because we have only one endogenous variable (minority concentration) and three
instruments, we can use Hansen’s J-statistic of overidentifying restrictions to test the validity of our
instruments. Under the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid (i.e. orthogonal to the error term) the
statistic is distributed chi-square with two degrees of freedom. The p-value associated with the test is
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0.16, implying the instruments pass the overidentification test at standard significance levels. Using a
“difference in Sargan” statistic or a C-statistic, we can also test the validity of a subset of instruments. In
the current context the instrument that is most questionable is the average percent minority in all other
schools within a 20 radius (i.e. the instrument based on the smallest geographical area). Under the null
hypothesis that the instrument is valid, the statistic is distributed chi-square with one degree of freedom;
the p-value is 0.24, and thus the instrument appears valid.
Omitted school characteristics
The results reported thus far lead naturally to the question of whether minority concentration is
directly driving the voting behavior of white households or whether the voting behavior of those
households is simply being driven by some omitted factor that is correlated with minority concentration.
For example, if schools with high concentrations of minority students tend to have lower average test
scores, our minority concentration variable could simply be picking up the fact that white families are
more likely to support the voucher if their child attends a low-performing school. From the perspective of
whether or not vouchers will lead to increased racial segregation, this distinction is unimportant. But to
policymakers looking for ways to mitigate these stratification effects, uncovering the underlying
preferences may yield useful insights. To examine this, we added two additional variables to our baseline
model. The first variable is the 2000 Academic Performance Index (API) of high schools in our sample.
The API is a score, ranging from 200 to 1000, that reflects the overall performance of students in a
particular school on the Stanford 9, a nationally-normed test. The second variable is the fraction of
students that are limited English proficient at each of the high schools in our sample. In California, the
largest minority group, by far, is students are of Hispanic decent and a large percentage of these students
are limited English proficient. Thus, minority concentration in California is likely to be highly correlated
with the fraction of students that are limited English proficient. Furthermore, Betts and Fairlie (2003)
find evidence that white families are significantly more likely to enroll their children in private school if
they live in areas with high concentrations of immigrant children who speak a language other than
English at home. We therefore include the fraction of students that are limited English proficient to
examine whether “white flight” is likely to be particularly pronounced if a large fraction of minority
students speak a language other than English.
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Table 6
Estimated Coefficients for White Households with Children in Public School:
Expanded Specifications
Regression Specification:
Minority
Homeowner
Conservative
Female
Rural

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.246**
(0.108)
-0.034
(0.044)
0.278**
(0.040)
-0.056
(0.040)
0.143**
(0.067)

0.081
(0.154)
-0.037
(0.045)
0.276**
(0.040)
-0.057
(0.040)
0.142**
(0.065)
-0.321
(0.224)

0.072
(0.145)
-0.029
(0.044)
0.276**
(0.040)
-0.059
(0.040)
0.143**
(0.066)
…
…
0.526*
(0.277)

0.001
(0.166)
-0.033
(0.045)
0.276**
(0.040)
-0.058
(0.041)
0.143**
(0.065)
-0.215
(0.238)
0.406
(0.304)

Log API
Fraction LEP

Observations
672
668
672
668
R-squared
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.16
Notes: (1) Robust, clustered standard errors in brackets, (2) all specifications include MSA fixed effects,
(3) * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%

Results based on the expanded set of explanatory variables are reported in Table 6.20 For
comparison purposes, column 1 of Table 6 reports the results from our original specification (column 1 of
Table 2). Column 2 reports results from an expanded specification that also includes the Academic
Performance Index. The inclusion of this variable causes the coefficient on minority concentration to
decline rather sharply from 0.246 to 0.081 and become statistically insignificant.21 Column 3 reports
results from an expanded specification that replaces test scores with the fraction of students that are
limited English proficient. Once again, adding this variable to the baseline model causes the point
estimate on the minority concentration variable to decline sharply from 0.246 to 0.072 and become
statistically insignificant. The final column of Table 6 reports results from an expanded specification that
includes both the API index and the fraction of limited English proficient students. Including both of
these variables causes the coefficient on minority concentration to decline even further to 0.001. Overall,
20

The results are based on the sample that includes respondents that lived in a zip code where at least 75% of the
population resided within the boundaries of a single school district.
21
The fact that neither the coefficient on minority concentration nor the coefficient on the Academic Performance
Index is statistically significant is not particularly surprising given the high correlation between the two variables.
In our sample, that correlation is -0.78. If the model is estimated with the API included but minority concentration
excluded, the coefficient on API remains negative and is statistically significant at the 5% level.
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the results reported in Table 6 suggest that a large portion of the “white flight” uncovered in Table 2 can
be attributed to factors other than school racial composition. In particular, white households appear to be
responding not to racial composition of a school per se, but rather to factors that tend to be highly
correlated with racial composition, such as the English proficiency of students and a school’s overall
academic performance.
IV.

Analysis Using Aggregate Vote Returns
As noted previously, our primary analysis relies on polling data collected prior to the actual vote

on the voucher initiative and thus represents stated versus revealed preferences for school vouchers. That
fact raises the potential concern that our polling data may not accurately represent voting behavior. For
example, in the case of school vouchers, a voter’s response to a poll may be heavily influenced by his or
her political ideology while their actual vote may be more strongly affected by economic factors, such as
the net fiscal cost of the voucher program. In the present context, concerns over the stated versus
revealed nature of our data may be particularly important given the disparity between the fraction of
survey respondents that reported they would support the voucher (46%) and the fraction of voters that
actually supported the voucher initiative in November (30%). Ideally, we would like to base our analysis
on data from exit polls or actual voting data that was linked to detailed individual characteristics and
residential location information. Unfortunately, such data are not available.
Nevertheless, while we do not have data on individual voting behavior, we do have block group
level data on the fraction of voters that supported the initiative and their characteristics, data that provides
us with the opportunity to conduct a robustness check of the results reported in Section III. To illustrate
how we utilize block group-level vote tallies, consider dividing the voters within block groups into four
mutually exclusive groups: white households with school-age children, nonwhite households with
school-age children, white households without school-age children, and nonwhite households without
school-age children. Specifically, let w denote whites, nw denote nonwhites and ’ denote households
with no school-age children. We specify four separate equations for the fraction of yes votes in a block
group, one equation for each of the four groups. By aggregating the linear probability model described in
equation (1) up to the block group level, the equation for each group k in block group j is:

y kjs = β 0k + β 1k M s + Pjsk + ε kjs ,

(7)

where k = [ w, w' , nw, nw' ] , y kjs denotes the fraction of yes votes on the voucher initiative for voters
located in block group j and school attendance area s , M s is the share of minority students at school s ,

Pjsk is the mean unobserved preference for racial homogeneity for voters of type k located in block
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group j (with an expectation of E[ Pis | j , k ] ) and ε kjs is a mean zero average idiosyncratic error term for
voters of type k located in block group j .
Since the proportion of yes votes cast by all four groups must sum to unity, we can express the
total proportion of yes votes at the block group level as:
nw
w'
w'
nw '
nw '
y js = π wjs ⋅ y wjs + π nw
js ⋅ y js + π js ⋅ y js + π js ⋅ y js ,

(8)

where π kjs is the fraction of households in group k . Using equation (7), equation (8) can be expressed
as:
nw
nw
w' w'
y js = β 0wπ wjs + β 1w M s ⋅ π wjs + β 0nwπ nw
js + β 1 M s ⋅ π js + β 0 π js
'
nw '
nw '
+ β 1w' M s ⋅ π wjs' + β 0nw'π nw
js + β 1 M s ⋅ π js + η js

,

(9)

w' w'
nw ' nw '
where η js = Pjswπ wjs + Pjsnwπ nw
js + Pjs π js + Pjs π js + ε js and ε js is the across-group weighted sums of

the four group-specific errors terms, ε kjs . Thus, η js contains both an idiosyncratic error term and the
group-specific unobservable preference components weighted by the fraction of voters in each group.
Equation (9) can be estimated using block group-level vote returns and the characteristics of voters in
each block group. The parameters of primary interest are β 1w and β 1nw . Specifically, β 1w measures how
white households with children respond to minority concentration while β 1nw measures how nonwhite
households with children respond to minority concentration.
We should note that our analysis using aggregate returns is simply presented to provide additional
support for the results reported in Section III and does not represent strong evidence for an equilibrium
effect of vouchers based on the aggregate data alone. By estimating the model of individual voting
behavior separately by minority status, we were able to focus on the effect of school racial composition
for white and nonwhite households separately. In an aggregate model of voting behavior, however, the
demographic composition of the block group is used to capture the relationship between minority status
and voting, and the expected value of parameter estimates arising from OLS are quite complex. For
example, the expectation for aggregate data estimates associated with white households with children is:

E[ β 1w,OLS | X ] = β 1w + I 2( X ' X ) −1 E[η js , X ] ,
w'
w'
nw '
'
'
π nw
π nw
where X = (π wjs π wjs M s π nw
js
js M s π js π js M s π js
js M s ) and
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(10)

I 2 = (0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0) . Even if π wjs M s were uncorrelated with any other regressor, which is
clearly untrue since the other population shares are negatively correlated with π wjs , the second term in
equation (10) will depend upon the correlation between π wjs M s and the unobservable, η js . The
unobservable contains terms representing the average preferences of all groups in the neighborhood, and
these terms are correlated with both π wjs and M s due to household sorting across neighborhoods and
schools. If there were no sorting across neighborhoods within school attendance areas, equation (3) could
be used to simplify the expression, but the expression would still depend upon α 0k and α 1k for all k not
just α 1w as in equation (6) for the survey data.
Data for Aggregate Analysis
The dependent variable in our analysis of aggregate vote returns is the fraction of voters in a
block group that supported the voucher initiative. Block group-level data on vote outcomes for
Proposition 38 were obtained from the Statewide Database, maintained by the Institute of Governmental
Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. The database contains aggregate vote outcomes and
voter registration information, for all statewide primary and general elections held in California since
1990.22
We use voter registration data from the Statewide Database and data from the 2000 Census to
construct block group-level explanatory variables that match as closely as possible the explanatory
variables we used in our analysis of the PPIC survey data. Those variables are: the fraction of the
population that are homeowners, the fraction of voters that are registered Republicans, and the fraction of
the voting age population (those individuals 18 years of age or older) that are female. Consistent with
equation (9) we also include the fraction of households that are white with school-age children, the
fraction of households that are nonwhite with school-age children, the fraction of households that are
white with no school-age children, and the fraction of households that are nonwhite with no school-age
children. To account for the fact that families with children in private school would have directly
benefited from the voucher, we also include one additional variable in our analysis of aggregate vote
returns, namely the fraction of K-12 students that are enrolled in private school. Following our analysis
using the survey data we also include an indicator variable for whether a school is located in a rural area
and a set of Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) fixed effects to control for unobservable regional
variation in support for school vouchers.

22

Detailed information on how the Statewide Database is constructed can be found at: http://swdb.berkeley.edu.
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To assign public school characteristics to individual block groups, we used the following
procedure. We first matched Census blocks to school districts and then to the closest public high school
within the appropriate district. We then created pseudo-block groups by aggregating up all the blocks
within a block group that matched to the same school. For 82% of our sample, these pseudo-block groups
are identical to the block group. That is, all blocks within a block group match to the exact same school.
In cases where a block group contains more than one pseudo-block group, we aggregated block-level data
on vote outcomes and the number of voters that were registered Republicans up to the pseudo-block
group level.23 For variables that were only available at the block group level (e.g. fraction of students
attending private school) we assigned the same values of the variable to all pseudo-block groups located
in the same block group. Our final sample consists of 25,712 block groups or pseudo-block groups that
are matched to 847 public high schools. Means and standard deviations for the variables used in our
analysis of aggregate vote returns are reported in Table 7A of the appendix.
Results
Table 7 shows the results from the estimation of equation (9).24 The equation is estimated using a
weighted least squares approach, where the weights correspond to the total number of voters in each
block group. In addition, the standard errors reported in Table 7 are adjusted for clustering of the data at
the school level. The coefficients of primary interest are those on the interaction terms between minority
concentration and the fractions of white and non-white households with school-age children.
The coefficient on the interaction between minority concentration and the fraction of white households
with school-age children is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating that these
households are more likely to support the voucher if their child attends a school with a large concentration
of minority students. That finding complements the survey results reported in Table 2. Furthermore, the
point estimate on minority concentration for white households with school-age children is 0.20, which is
quite close to the estimate obtained using the survey data of 0.24.
As shown in Table 7, the coefficient on the interaction between minority concentration and the
fraction of nonwhite households with school-age children is statistically insignificant, negative, and quite
small in magnitude, suggesting that the voting behavior of minority households with children is
unresponsive to the share of minority students their children are exposed to. Once again that finding
23

Block groups containing more than one pseudo-block group arise primarily because some block groups cross
district boundaries. In those cases, Census blocks within a block group are partitioned according to which school
district they belong to.
24
Note that we exclude the level variable (non-interaction variable) for the fraction of nonwhite households with no
children in the analysis. Thus, the coefficients on the fraction of white households with children, the fraction of
nonwhite households with children and the fraction of white households with no children reported at the bottom of
Table 7 are all relative to this omitted group.
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Table 7
Estimated Coefficients Using Aggregate Vote Returns
Variable

Coefficient

Minority*(White with Children)
Minority*(NonWhite with Children)
Minority*(White No Children)

0.204**
- 0.039
0.025**

Standard Error
(0.038)
(0.054)
(0.013)

Minority*(NonWhite No Children)

- 0.021

(0.047)

Fraction Homeowner

- 0.032**

(0.003)

0.397**

(0.012)

Fraction Female

- 0.103**

(0.025)

Fraction Private

0.024**

(0.004)

Rural

0.058**

(0.006)

- 0.096**

(0.041)

0.059

(0.084)

- 0.077*

(0.043)

Fraction Republican

Fraction White with Children
Fracation NonWhite with Children
Fractoin White No Children

Observations
25,712
R-squared
0.72
Notes: (1) Robust, clustered standard errors in brackets, (2) all specifications
include MSA fixed effects, (3) * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%

complements the results obtained using the PPIC survey, reported in Table 3. It is also important to point
out that the coefficient on the interaction term between school minority concentration and the fraction of
white households without school-age children, although statistically significant, is much smaller than for
white households with children. This is also generally consistent with the results reported in Table 3,
which revealed that white households with no school-age children were unresponsive to minority
concentration. Thus, the results reported in Table 7 provide further support for our contention that among
households with children in more-integrated schools, support for the voucher largely reflects a desire to
use the voucher.
The coefficients on the other control variables reported in Table 7 are also generally consistent
with those obtained using the survey data. For example, similar to the results reported in Tables 2 and 3,
the coefficients on fraction homeowner and fraction female are negative in Table 7. Furthermore, as in
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the survey data results, political ideology (as measured by the fraction of registered Republicans) has a
strong positive effect on the propensity of voters to support the voucher initiative.
As an additional robustness check of the survey results reported in Section III, we also estimated
several expanded versions of equation (9). Specifically, we added two additional school-level variables to
our model; the 2000 Academic Performance Index (API) of high schools and the fraction of students that
are limited English proficient (LEP). Following the logic behind equation (9), these variables enter our
model as interaction terms. In particular, each of these variables is interacted with the fraction of
households that are white with school-age children, the fraction of households that are nonwhite with
school age children, the fraction of households that are white without school-age children and the fraction
of households that are nonwhite without school-age children.
Results based on the expanded set of explanatory variables are reported in Table 8. Since the
inclusion of these additional variables had little impact on the other variables in our model, Table 8
reports only the coefficients on the interaction terms between the three school-level variables (fraction
minority, API, and fraction LEP) and the four ethnic/presence of school-age children variables. The first
two columns of Table 8 report results when the Academic Performance Index is added to the model,
while the last two columns report results with the fraction of students that are limited English proficient is
added.
As with the survey data, adding these variables to the model causes the coefficient on the
interaction between minority concentration and the fraction of white households with school-age children
to decline sharply in magnitude. When the fraction of LEP students is added to the specification, the
coefficient for white households with school-age children declines from 0.204 (Table 7) to 0.066 and
when test scores are added, the coefficient actually switches sign, becoming negative. Furthermore, note
that in the specification that includes the Academic Performance Index, the coefficient on the interaction
between the API and the fraction of white households with school-age children is negative and
statistically significant, indicating that these households are less likely to support school vouchers if their
child attends a high-performing public school. Similarly, in the expanded specification that includes the
fraction of LEP students, the coefficient on the interaction between LEP and the fraction of white
households with school-age children is positive and statistically significant, indicating that these
households are more likely to support school vouchers if their child attends a school with a high
percentage of limited English proficient students. Thus, consistent with the survey results reported in
Table 6, the results using the aggregate data suggest that white households with children appear to be
responding not to the racial composition of a school per se, but rather to factors that tend to be highly
correlated with racial composition, such as a school’s overall academic performance.
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Table 8
Estimated Coefficients Using Aggregate Vote Returns
Expanded Specifications

Variable

Including Test Scores
Standard
Coefficient
Error

Including Fraction LEP
Standard
Coefficient
Error

Minority*(White with Children)

- 0.119**

(0.052)

0.066

(0.055)

Minority*(Nonwhite with Children)

- 0.028

(0.059)

0.003

(0.057)

Minority*(White No Children)

- 0.021

(0.021)

0.051**

(0.019)

0.064

(0.045)

- 0.061

(0.049)

- 0.745**

(0.125)

…

…

0.049

(0.087)

…

…

- 0.061

(0.049)

…

…

(0.061)

…

…

Minority*(Nonwhite No Children)
Log API*(White with Children)
Log API*(Nonwhite with Children)
Log API*(White No Children)
Log API*(Nonwhite No Children)

0.121**

LEP*(White with Children)

…

…

0.418**

(0.166)

LEP*(Nonwhite with Children)

…

…

- 0.156**

(0.070)

LEP*(White No Children)

…

…

- 0.078

(0.051)

LEP*(Nonwhite No Children)

…

…

0.126*

(0.068)

25,445
25,712
Observations
0.75
0.72
R-squared
Notes: (1) Robust, clustered standard errors in brackets, (2) all specifications include MSA fixed
effects, (3) * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%

V. Conclusion
The debate over school vouchers has many dimensions and will no doubt continue into the
foreseeable future. In this paper, we provide evidence on one consequence of universal vouchers,
namely, their impact on racial segregation across schools. Although previous studies of white flight have
provided insights about whether race is a factor in the school choice decisions of white households, we
suggest that those studies have either under- or over-estimated the impact that a universal voucher
program is likely to have on racial segregation. In our empirical work, we find that among white
households with children, support for vouchers increases with the proportion of minority students in the
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local public schools. This is not true of non-white households, suggesting that if a voucher program were
implemented, schools that are currently more integrated would likely lose more white students and racial
stratification would increase. At the same time, our results indicate that households have already sorted to
a significant degree, so that the additional effect on segregation would not be as large as indicated by
causal estimates of the effect of school minority concentration. We also find evidence that it is not race,
per se, that is the primary motivation, but rather school characteristics that are highly correlated with race,
including test scores and the proportion of students that are limited English proficient.
Our study faces a number of limitations. The ideal data for this sort of analysis would be
individual voting data or exit polls. Instead, the PPIC survey data represent stated (versus revealed)
preferences for school vouchers, while the voting tallies from the Statewide Database represent aggregate
vote outcomes. Neither is perfect, though the extent of bias in each is unknown. However, the fact that
our results are fairly consistent with both data sources gives us more confidence in our general
conclusions.
It is also important to point out that extrapolation to other states depends on the amount of sorting
that has already occurred in those states. On the one hand, California’s size and diversity may make it
easier for households to sort through residential location choice; if so, the equilibrium effect will appear
smaller and the effect of vouchers on racial segregation will be larger in states where such sorting is more
difficult. On the other hand, California has experienced a large increase in non-white immigration in the
last decade, so it may be more difficult for white Californians to sort into a school with their mostpreferred racial mix. In that case, the equilibrium effect of racial concentration on voucher support in
other states would be smaller, not larger, than in California.
Finally, our results give some indication that it is not race itself that is driving voter behavior but
other school characteristics, such as school quality. This suggests that policymakers could mitigate the
effects of vouchers on racial segregation by weakening the link between school racial composition and
school quality, although that itself certainly is a problem with no easy solutions. Our results also raise
concerns about more limited voucher programs, particularly those targeted to low-performing school.
These smaller programs may lead to racial segregation just as severe as a universal voucher, as the
targeted schools are precisely the schools that white households are most likely to want to leave.
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Appendix
Table 2A
Coefficient Estimates for White Households with School-Age Children:
Alternative Sample Restrictions
Regression
Specification:
Minority
Homeowner
Conservative
Female
Rural

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.151
(0.101)
-0.033
(0.042)
0.255**
(0.039)
-0.072*
(0.038)
0.103
(0.069)

0.198*
(0.107)
-0.031
(0.044)
0.262**
(0.040)
-0.069*
(0.039)
0.128*
(0.069)

0.246**
(0.108)
-0.034
(0.044)
0.278**
(0.040)
-0.056
(0.040)
0.143**
(0.067)

0.275**
(0.110)
-0.036
(0.045)
0.291**
(0.042)
-0.069*
(0.041)
0.152**
(0.066)

0.304**
(0.121)
-0.008
(0.048)
0.266**
(0.044)
-0.074*
(0.044)
0.137*
(0.079)

Observations
743
698
672
625
R-squared
0.13
0.15
0.16
0.17
Notes: (1) Robust, clustered standard errors in brackets, (2) all specifications
include MSA fixed effects, (3) * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%

561
0.16

Table 7A
Summary Statistics for Aggregate Vote Returns
Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Fraction Voting Yes
Fraction H.H With Children White
Fraction H.H. With Children Nonwhite
Fraction H.H. No Children White
Fraction H.H. No Children Nonwhite
Fraction Homeowner
Fraction Republican
Fraction Female
Fraction Private
School Minority Concentration
Rural

0.29
0.14
0.13
0.50
0.22
0.65
0.36
0.52
0.14
0.55
0.07

0.07
0.09
0.12
0.21
0.16
0.26
0.15
0.03
0.15
0.27
0.15

Observations
Schools

25,712
847
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